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FROM ''MORAL STUPIDITY" TO PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmILITY
THOMAS D. EISELE·
"We are all of us born in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder
to feed our supreme selves: Dorothea had early begun to emerge from
that stupidity, but yet it had been easier to her to imagine how she
would devote herself to Mr Casaubon, and become wise and strong in
his strength and wisdom, than to conceive with that distinctness which
is no longer reflection but feeling-an idea wrought back to the
directness of sense, like the solidity of objects-that he had an
equivalent centre of self, whence the lights and shadows must always
fall with a certain difference."
George Eliot, Middlemarch 1

Within the context-even, the challenge-presented by the first
chapter of Seymour Wishman's book, Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer, 2
we symposiasts have been invited to say something about the teaching
of courses which in law school go under the titles, "Legal Ethics,"
"Professional Ethics," or "Professional Responsibility." This last is the
title of a two-credit course that I teach, in what I take to be a fairly
traditional form, over the span of a semester at the University of
Cincinnati. In this essay, I want to talk about the teaching of such a
course; not about how I manage to teach it, however, but rather why I
find it so difficult to teach.
For I do find the traditional Legal Ethics course difficult to
teach-difficult and demanding and frustrating. And it is difficult in a
way that I believe is not common to the difficulties and demands faced
in teaching other traditional courses in law school (e.g., Property,
Estates & Trusts, Jurisprudence). By way of warning, I should note that
in making my comments I claim no expertise in this field. I have taught
Legal Ethics only three times in the past seven years. What I have to

* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. I appreciate the
critical comments on an earlier version of this paper that I received from Jim Elkins, Tom
Shaffer, and Jim White. They helped me to say better what I wished to say, without
endorsing it.
I dedicate this essay to Tom Shaffer, as a way of honoring his work in this field. No one
of whom I know has made a more personal or professional contribution to the teaching of
Legal Ethics. Tom Shaffer cares; and he is committed to the ensuing work entailed by such
caring.
1 George Eliot, MIDDLEMARCH 243 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, W. J. Harvey ed.,
1965)(first published 1871-1872).
2 Seymour Wishman, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (New York: Penguin Books,
1982)(1981).
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say, then, others before me may have noticed-and they may have noted
it better, or at least differently, than I shall mark and enter it here for
discussion. All I wish for my comments is that they help to identify what
seems to be a systematic tension in the teaching of a traditional Legal
Ethics course, and that they do so within the context of considering
Seymour Wishman's balanced and considered recounting of his own
struggles (as he was turning himself into an experienced criminal
lawyer) with the ethics of his actions.
I.

THE DIFFICULTY OF TEACHING A TRADITIONAL COURSE IN LEGAL
ETHICS

Let me start by saying that Legal Ethics is my least favorite course
among the five courses that I teach with any regularity. This is not a
promising beginning. Nevertheless, it seems the right place to start,
because such an admission impels me to seek some sort of an
explanation for this lack of enthusiasm. After all, as a law teacher of
some 10-15 years of experience, I am admitting that I take responsibility
for teaching a course that I don't much enjoy. Short of masochism, why
would anyone (anyone with tenure) undertake such an apparently selfeviscerating project? Also, I recognize that my attitude toward the
traditional Legal Ethics course is incongruous in another respect. Over
the years, I have on the whole enjoyed teaching in law school and have
found it rewarding. So why is this course so difficult? What might
explain my antipathy toward teaching Legal Ethics?
The most readily available candidate for an explanation-the fact
that the materials of such a course are themselves difficult and
unwieldy-can, I think, be put aside. It is notorious that, in dealing with
issues of professional ethics, the applicable materials are various and
complicated. They include not only a variety of federal and state cases,
but also two general codes from the American Bar Association3 (adopted
in several variations by the 50 states), as well as a vast array of state
and federal statutes. (In using the phrase, "traditional Legal Ethics
course," I am assuming in part that such a course comprises this
collection of variegated source materials. A differently constituted course
would not be "traditional" in my use of that term.) Then, too, this
plethora of materials is further complicated by the fact that cases posing
legal ethics issues arise within (and implicate other issues of law in)
every area of substantive and procedural law. These facts mean,

3 The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the 1983 Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
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however, only that a course in Legal Ethics is difficult to master. But
such difficulty is not in itself a reason for rmding a Legal Ethics course
unrewarding. AB many teachers would testify, the challenge of
mastering a difficult course can be a spur to a teacher's creativity,
goading one on to greater effort. Mastery brings with it an increased
sense of accomplishment. (For example, in my struggles to master the
notorious Rule against Perpetuities, which I teach in both my Property
and my Estates & Trusts courses, the difficulty of mastering the Rule
has not meant that I have fo'und teaching either course unrewarding;
just the opposite is true.)
If, then, it is not simply the struggle of comprehending such various
materials, and of communicating them cogently to one's students, what
makes the traditional Legal Ethics course difficult to teach? And why
might one find the teaching of these materials to be unrewarding? In
thinking about these questions, I have come to the conclusion that
teaching the traditional Legal Ethics course is difficult (and I find it
unrewarding) because it engages me in teaching in a way that I do not
otherwise teach in law school. One way of stating my sense of the
pervasive difficulty of teaching a traditional course in Legal Ethics is to
say that, in such a course, law teachers are asked (or required-by the
materials) to teach against how or what we teach in most other courses
in law school.
The dilemma is this. In law school, we teach our students how to
analyze and argue cases, using the rules and the legal materials as they
find them, whichever side they may find themselves on. 4 This means
that law students must learn to understand and apply legal rules
without qualms about any pre-existing commitment they may have in
favor of one side or another of a legal issue. Or, perhaps it is better to
say, law students are asked to commit themselves only to the argument
itself, to forging the best argument (logically, rationally, persuasively)
they can manage to forge out of the materials at hand. In this respect,
they are rhetoricians. And this is not a bad thing; "rhetoric" is not an
epithet in law school. 5 Law students are expected, and are trained, to

• Elsewhere, I have tried to describe in more detail the process of disillusionment and
reaffirmation through which law teachers take their students (on my account of a modified
Socratic method of teaching). A part of this lesson is learning that the applicable rules,
cases, and other legal materials always have two (or more) sides. Interested readers might
wish to look at my essay: Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by
Disillusionment, 45 Mercer L, Rev. 587 (1994).
5 More than anyone else, James Boyd White has made accessible-while he also has
resuscitated-the rhetorical dimension of lawyering, His work rescues rhetoric from its
pejorative fate in the ancient tradition of Socrates and Plato (by using the very resources
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commit themselves to the side they are fortuitously assigned in class,
just as they will find themselves in practice committing themselves to
their client, whoever he or she may be, when the client walks into their
law offices and presents them with a legal problem, a case.
This way of teaching instructs law students that they are agents for
their clients, fiduciaries who must take seriously the responsibility of
representing their client's interests as best they can. By and large, law
students learn this lesson well. In my experience, they take seriously
their vicarious responsibility for the positions they assert and defend (as
they also take seriously their personal responsibility for the quality of
the work they do in law school). And this development continues in law
practice, where it is pretty much the normal course of events for lawyers
to adopt the positions of their clients. By advocating clients' positions or
interests, we advocates identify with them-those positions or interests
and, indirectly, with those clients. (In a sense, we turn ourselves into
them.) I suspect that most of us most of time become captured by the
positions and interests of our clients, of our principals. "You are what
you speak." We become co-opted by, or captive of, the side we represent.
We come to believe in the justice of the case we are presenting (in court
or in negotiations).
But this way of teaching changes in traditional Legal Ethics courses,
or the dynamics of the teaching change. In the traditional Legal Ethics
course, we typically try to prevent (or, at least, to resist) this transformation. In such courses, we turn around and ask our students to pierce
the veil of their vicarious (substitute) responsibility, their representation
of their client's interests, so that they can consider the ethical dimension
of their own actions on behalf of their principal. In effect, we are
challenging our students to assess themselves (their behavior, their
actions as lawyers for their clients) on the basis of their own cares and
commitments, their own interests. And yet they still are being taught
this lesson within the larger context of their being taught to emulate
and enact the role of the uncommitted advocate, the advocate for hire.
In traditional Legal Ethics courses, then, we teachers seem to be
telling our students (asking them, rather) to conform their lawyering
activities to the following two conflicting maxims:

of that tradition to reconstitute itselO. In particular, I recommend White's third book as an
instructive way of coming to appreciate the rhetorical dimension of the law. See James
Boyd White, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHEToRIC AND POETICS OF THE LAw (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)(especially Chapter 2).
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(1) Treat this activity oflawyering-of argument, of advocacy, even of
analysis-as something impersonal to you: it is a task, a professional
challenge or chore, but something that exists only on the level of your
representation of another, your vicarious (substitute) responsibility for
the interests and rights of another person; and
(2) Treat this same activity oflawyering as something personal to you,
something for which you take not only professional responsibility but
also personal responsibility, something for which you are answerable
(as any person is).

We seem to be telling our students two fundamentally opposed
things: (1) Be impersonal and professional; and (2) Be yourself (be the
person you were or are outside of your role as lawyer). And, if this is
what we are saying, then how can we expect our students to embrace
such a fundamentally dissonant activity? Can we expect them, or even
hope for them, to resolve it? (Where "it" refers to perhaps the fundamental antinomy of the legal profession, in so far as that profession is built
upon an adversarial ethic, or an ethics of advocacy.) I am not sure that
we can expect them to achieve on their own a resolution of this conflict.
Yet, I also am not sure that in class I can help them to resolve this
conflict. For a teacher, it is an unrewarding fix in which to find oneself.
II.

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY V. VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY

I am not the first person to have noticed this dichotomy in the
dynamics of teaching a Legal Ethics course. For example, I hear this
perception of dissonance being expressed in the "Introduction" of the
book that I like best in this area, Thomas L. Shaffer's wonderfully rich
and challenging casebook, American Legal Ethics. s
Shaffer introduces his casebook by noting the extent to which a
Legal Ethics course can be built around two related conflicts of values.
He says (1) that, on his view, the field of Legal Ethics "insists on being
both personal and cultural";7 and (2) that its questions "are broad
[moral] questions; but ... they are also vicarious."8 He brings together
these two possible foci of a Legal Ethics course in the following passage:

6 Thomas L. Shaffer, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TExT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS
(New York: Matthew Bender, 1985).
7 Id. at xxi (emphases in original).
8 Id. at xxiii.
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This vicarious focus gives our subject two kinds of tension: (1) between
a lawyer's morals and the morals of his client, and (2) between a
lawyer's morals and his sense of public and professional duty. Those
tensions are topical in legal-ethics classrooms; we who work together
there are aware of the tensions; we feel them. 9
Some teachers may feel or experience these tensions. But do we know
what to make ofthem? I am not sure that we-or that I-do.
Shaffer's identification of these tensions, these dynamic pressures
and conflicts, is rich beyond count, and his work suggests any number
of dimensions along which we might measure the course of a person's
ethical conflicts. I cannot profitably work out the variety of dimensions
here, but instead must limit myself simply to mentioning two.
First, Shaffer's "personal/cultural" distinction cuts in a couple of
directions. At a minimum, it describes (i) the tension between an
individual lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a person, as an
individual; and that individual lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a
member of a community-be the community legal or non-legal (religious,
political, ethnic, whatever). And the "personal/cultural" distinction also
describes (ii) the tension between an individual lawyer's sense of himself
or herself as a lawyer, an individual craftsperson; and that individual
lawyer's sense of himself or herself as a member of the profession, the
legal community.lO
Second, Shaffer's "moral/vicarious" distinction also cuts in a couple
of directions. At a minimum, it portends (i) the tension between a
lawyer's commitment to his or her own personal moral code; and that
same lawyer's commitment to a professional moral code. The
"moral/vicarious" distinction also describes (ii) the tension between a
lawyer's commitment to any moral code (be it personal or professional);
and that same lawyer's commitment to represent the interests of his or
her client (the person for whom he or she is vicariously responsible).
Here, I am drawing selectively from Shaffer's dichotomies to
examine, on the one hand, a lawyer's personal responsibility for what he
or she does; and, on the other, his or her vicarious responsibility for the
same. Let me try to develop this distinction on what seems to be an
intuitive level. At a minimum, lawyers are personally responsible for

Id. at xxiv (emphasis in original).
It seems to me to be possible that an individual lawyer might also be divided between
his or her sense of himself or herself as an individual craftsperson; and his or her belonging
to a non-legal community (be it religious, political, ethnic, or whatever). But this further
development only emphasizes my earlier statement that these dichotomies are capable of
additional elaboration, and I do not here wish to proceed further along this line.
9

10
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what they make out of the legal materials at their disposal. If they
fashion a poor argument or craft a lousy brief, this is something for
which they are personally responsible. This poor argument, this lousy
brief, is something they themselves did, and it reflects directly upon
their person (even in its guise as a lawyer). That a lawyer has to make
an argument on behalf of his or her client is not something the lawyer
has chosen; it is a necessity of the role of being a lawyer, a necessity of
the activity oflawyering. This much every lawyer must accept--or else
stop being a lawyer. But which argument a lawyer makes on behalf of
his or her client-and how the selected argument is made-are very
much a function of choices made by that lawyer.
Summarizing, I would say that a lawyer is vicariously responsible
for the necessity of making an argument, because that is something he
or she must do once the lawyer has accepted the assignment of
representing a particular client. The lawyer is vicariously responsible for
making an argument because this is something done on behalf of the
client; it is done as proxy for the client (because the client otherwise
would have to make an argument for himself or herself, if no one were
willing to represent him or her). But what argument the lawyer
subsequently makes and how well or poorly he or she makes it are both
actions for which the lawyer is personally responsible. The particular
argument made is an artifact that the lawyer has fashioned and entered
into the legal arena, and every artist or craftsman is personally
responsible for his or her work.
This is, for me, the most intuitive level on which the "personal"
versus "vicarious" distinction works. But this distinction also seems
applicable to the activity of lawyering on a slightly different level,
perhaps a more general or abstract one. Here we are talking not about
the specific distinction between types of responsibility solely at the level
of legal argument, but rather about differing types of responsibility that
a lawyer has qua lawyer (whatever activity oflawyering the lawyer may
be engaged in, be it making an argument or something else). What we
might call our "vicarious responsibility as lawyers" locates our
responsibility for the protection and advancement (if legally possible) of
our clients' best interests. We substitute for (stand in the shoes of) our
clients in the sense that we try to achieve their goals or effect their
wishes (all, of course, within the bounds of the law). On the other hand,
our "personal responsibility as individuals who happen to be lawyers"
locates, instead, our responsibility for the consequences of our actions in
our role as lawyers, including their effects upon people not our clients.
Vicarious responsibility narrows or focuses our responsibility by
limiting it (not removing it). Our vicarious responsibility is concentrated
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in our role as advocate for and protector of the interests of our client. In
terms of vicarious responsibility, we lawyers are (solely? wholly?)
committed to our client's well-being. ll
Personal responsibility, on the other hand, dilutes our responsibility
(again, without removing it). It spreads wider the net or web of our
moral commitments by including in this wider system the interests and
well-being of others: parties for the other side, "neutral" parties (e.g.,
witnesses or experts at a trial), the court itself (at least in the person of
the judge), lawyers for the other side, and so on. Our personal
responsibility includes our actions as lawyers in so far as we are persons
or individuals (who happen to be lawyers). In this respect, then, the role
of lawyering does not define or delimit our personal responsibility. This
professional role may, in fact, involve us in more-and in more
complicated-ethical relationships than we otherwise would find
ourselves involved in. On the personal level, the role of lawyering does
not contract our moral responsibility-instead, that role expands our
moral responsibility. Whereas, on the vicarious level, the role of
lawyering contracts (rather than expands) our moral responsibility. This
dissonance in moral effect, then, seems to be the source of many ens~g
ethical conflicts.
If I am correct in my brief sketch of this complex of relationships
between vicarious responsibility and personal responsibility, then I hope
that it can serve as a rough guide for thinking about some of the

11 I hesitate here (putting in parentheses my queries, "solely? wholly?") because I am
mindful that lawyers have professional responsibilities toward people or institutions other
than their clients (e.g., toward a court in which they are appearing or the judge before
whom they are appearing). It seems to me at least initially plausible to characterize such
responsibilities as being in part vicarious and in part personal, and it would require a great
deal of time and space to develop or show the plausibility in such a claim.
On the other hand, there seem to be professional responsibilities that are neither
vicarious nor personal. For example, we sometimes speak of a lawyer's responsibility "for
the (current state or condition of the) law," or "for the legal system (as a whole)."
Sometimes, we even speak oflawyers' being responsible for "our criminal justice system"
or the "workings of the judicial process." How are we conceiving such responsibilities? They
hardly seem equivalent to the vicarious responsibility a lawyer has for the interests of his
or her client, for they are not episodic in the same way and do not seem to be related to a
specific task accepted-{)r a particular agency relationship assumed-by a lawyer (as is the
case, I believe, with a lawyers vicarious responsibility toward a client). On the other hand,
I do not know that I would be willing to call these "personal responsibilities," because such
objects as "the law" or "the state of the criminal justice system" do not strike me as the
sorts of things for which a person can take personal responsibility.
Accordingly, I am aware that the dichotomy I explore (between vicarious and personal
responsibility) neither explains nor clarifies everything we may want to know about a
lawyer's responsibilities for his or her actions.
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conflicting ethical demands made upon lawyers' behavior. Now, I want
to move on to ask: Can we expect or hope that our students in a
traditional Legal Ethics course will be able to resolve this complex
tension of ethical commitments or responsibilities?
I doubt that they can. The problem, as I see it, is this. In teaching
law, as I stated above, we traditionally require our students to make
arguments (or to perform case analyses) in class. And the rules (or the
cases) are there, in the classroom, to be used in argument (or to be
analyzed). Since they are there, we-all who participate in the
class-can witness and assess how well or poorly, how aptly or
inappropriately, how cogently or incoherently, the student does
performing the assignment. This means that we all can see and judge
how the assigned student relates himself or herself to the task at hand:
how well they argue, how poorly they analyze, how cogently they
marshal the facts, how incoherently they recount the parties' stories, etc.
The arguments, the cases, the facts, the claims-all of them are a part
of the reality of the classroom; they are something we actually create as
well as use (along with the aid and assistance of our students) before our
very eyes. They exist in the classroom as a product of people arguing,
debating, analyzing, hypothesizing, explaining, describing, etc., then and
there.
It mayor may not be the case that the argument a student makes
in class would or would not "work" in the "real world"; that is a matter
for speculation and, possibly, informed debate. But it is necessarily the
case that the argument made in the classroom does either work or fail
there, as it is made. 12 And so we can assess each student's fulfillment of
his or her personal responsibility for the rightness, the aptness, the
cogency, ofthe argument. The student's responsibility for what he or she
has fashioned can be studied and assessed in the classroom.
The same cannot be said for the student's ability either to represent
a client, or to relate to a client (or, for that matter, a student's ability to
relate to other, non-client parties who might hypothetically be made a
part of the argumentative context). Except for special situations-such
as clinical settings or empirical simulations-we cannot say that there

12 When we make an argument in law school, that is exactly what we do: we make an
argument. It may not be exactly the same argument one would make in court (or in front
of a particular judge), but it remains as truly and actually an argument as any might or can
be. And the student's responsibility for the argument he or she fashions remains the same
as it would be in the so-called "real world." In other words, the student's responsibility for
the quality of the argument he or she makes, does not change depending upon the forum
in which the student makes the argument.
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is a client for a student to represent, or to whom to relate. 13 No actual
client exists; no actual lawsuit exists; and no actual court exists. And,
because of this, there is no way we have oftrying to estimate or assess
how a student might treat the client, how he or she might actually
resolve a conflict that arises (say) between the student's sense of
vicarious responsibility for the client's interests and the student's sense
of personal responsibility (toward himself or herself or toward others).
We can, of course, try to simulate these things, and sometimes we
succeed. But the value of simulation as a teaching technique only proves
my point, because what we are trying to simulate in the classroom is the
thing we feel missing: the reality of the other, the reality of the client and
of others involved in an actual lawsuit (or legal transaction). We resort
to simulation when we feel the need for a larger dose of reality, when we
feel the need for more realism. But what we are thereby trying to make
real, to simulate, is the reality ofthe ethical conflict between a lawyer's
personal and vicarious responsibilities. Perhaps, on occasion, legal
clinics and class simulations fill this need;14 but, without them, the
classroom experience of a Legal Ethics course does not and cannot
reproduce or duplicate the reality of the ethical conflict we expect (or
hope) our students will learn to resolve in such courses. And, without
such replication, how can we expect them to achieve such a resolution?
How are they supposed to resolve a conflict that we are unable to
reproduce in the classroom?
I am trying to convey my sense that arguments in law school (as well
as analyses, hypotheses, theories, claims, facts, etc.) are factors in
relation to which a law student's behavior can be assessed (ethically, or
otherwise). But a law student's behavior cannot be assessed with respect
to how well (or poorly) the student relates to his or her client (or to the
client's lawsuit, or to the court, or to the judge, or to the other parties,

,3 I am reminded that my remarks are limited to what I am calling the "traditional Legal
Ethics course" when I read the collection of materials in a recent symposium issue:
Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1995). These materials suggest that
alternative courses exist. For example, Robert Burns describes a one-semester course at
Northwestern University that integrates Trial Advocacy, Evidence, and Legal Ethics taught
through simulation, which integrated course receives 10-credits. See Robert Burns,
Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through Simulation, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 37, 43 n.
19 (1995). Still, for law schools lacking either the curricular flexibility or the institutional
resources described in this set of papers, I suspect that the traditional Legal Ethics course
will remain the norm. (Perhaps it should not; but I suspect it will.)
1< On teaching legal ethics in a clinical setting, see Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching
Legal Ethics in the Law Office, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 605 (1996); and Christine Mary
Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative Approach to Teaching Legal
Ethics, 58 Law & Con temp. Probs. 287 (1995).
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etc.) because no such client (or lawsuit, or court, ... ) exists in law school.
So, the potential conflict between the student's personal responsibility
and his or her vicarious responsibility, is not reallyoposed in class, and
it cannot be. (I do not say that such a conflict cannot be imagined or
described in class; I only say that it cannot be created or posed.) In the
law school setting (except, again, in the circumstances of live-client
clinics and some empirical simulations), creating or duplicating such a
conflict is not a pedagogical possibility. And, if such a conflict cannot be
posed, then whatever learning we hope to be generated or gained by a
student's struggling to resolve such a possible conflict, cannot
occur-because the conflict is not there for the student to resolve.
III. WISHMAN'S STORY
It is at this juncture that I find Wishman's autobiographical passage
to be useful. It shows us how and when and where ethical conflicts can
arise in the life of a lawyer. In this respect, Wishman's account is a
useful supplement to the law school classroom, because Wishman's story
demonstrates that these potential conflicts (about which we may have
been talking in the classroom, but which are, I am claiming, generally
impossible to duplicate in the classroom) are real. They can and do
happen to lawyers in the course of their professional lives. So Wishman
shows us, for example, that a lawyer's vicarious responsibility for his
client may well conflict with that lawyer's personal responsibility toward
himself, or toward others (who may include-but who are not limited
to-his client), or toward all of these people, and perhaps even others.
Such conflicts are often lived out in the developing life of any lawyer.
The story in Wishman's first chapter tells of the development of his
moral sensibility as a young lawyer, and for this purpose Wishman
focuses on two very distressing, disconcerting, experiences. One relates
to a nurse, a Mrs. Lewis, who was the victim of an alleged rape and,
thus, was the main witness at the trial regarding the crime. Wishman
was counsel for the defendant. How Wishman treated Mrs. Lewis on the
witness stand, and how he later came to view his treatment of her, are
the two main threads of his first recounting.
The other person Wishman tells us about in his first chapter is an
unnamed defendant in a criminal case prosecuted by Wishman roughly
8-10 years prior to the incident with Mrs. Lewis. This earlier case dealt
with a robbery and an associated assault and battery (with Mace) of the
robbery victim. Here again, Wishman's story hinges on how he initially
perceived his actions during trial (which led to the defendant's
conviction), and how he later came to think that perhaps he had acted
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inappropriately, and what Wishman did to correct the impropriety (as
he then saw it) of his earlier actions.
In the first case, regarding Mrs. Lewis, Wishman recounts how one
night he was entering the lobby of a hospital's emergency room,
escorting the sister of an injured client who was at the hospital. In
crossing the lobby, Wishman was assailed by a nurse-Mrs. Lewis, it
turns out, but at the time she was unknown to Wishman by name or
sight. This nurse, infuriated by the mere sight of Wishman, shouted
obscenities and tried to get Wishman thrown out ofthe hospital.
When things calmed down, Wishman realized that this nurse had
been the complainant and main witness in a rape case where Wishman
had defended the alleged attacker. During his cross-examination ofthe
nurse, Wishman had suggested that she had had consensual intercourse
with the defendant and had filed a false rape charge when the defendant
failed to pay for the sex. But now, in retrospect, after suffering this
assault upon his own sensibilities, Wishman is somewhat shocked and
abashed to realize, in recalling his treatment of the witness, that he had
humiliated her. His cross-examination of Mrs. Lewis had exposed her to
a second humiliation, heaped upon that of the first (her rape):
Weighing on me more heavily than the possibility that I had helped a
guilty man escape punishment was the undeniable fact that I had
humiliated the victim-alleged victim-in my cross-examination of her.
But, as all criminal lawyers know, to be effective in court I had to act
forcefully, even brutally, at times. I had been trained in law school to
regard the 'cross' as an art form. In the course of my career I had
frequently discredited witnesses. My defense of myself had always
been that there was nothing personal in what I was doing. This woman
[Mrs. Lewis, the witness-victim] was obviously unwilling to dismiss my
behavior as merely an aspect of my professional responsibility.... 15

Wishman's initial view had been that brutality was a part of crossexamination; perhaps not inevitably or necessarily a part of it, but the
possibility of being brutal on cross-examination is always there in the
trial process. Any aspiring lawyer learns, he says, that the "art" of crossexamination might turn into a brutal exercise. To Wishman's mind, this
possibility has to be accepted as a part of the price we pay for our
adversarial system of justice. Its possible (or likely) effect on the witness
is somehow justified by its being "merely" a part or aspect of a lawyer's
"professional responsibility."
In the second case, Wishman tells how it dawned on him, only after

15

Wishman, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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trial, that he had helped to convict a defendant who possibly was
innocent. The defendant had visited an employment agency shortly
before it was robbed, and the agency manager had been sprayed with
Mace during the robbery. The agency manager had subsequently
identified the defendant as the perpetrator, whereas the defendant
proclaimed his innocence. The defense was based upon the defendant's
claim to have visited the agency shortly before the attack, at which time
the defendant had filled out some employment forms in his own
handwriting. The defendant suggested that the manager was confusing
the defendant with the assailant; the defendant's face "seemed" familiar
to the victim (so the defense argument went) only because the defendant
had visited the employment office earlier in the day. But the defense
failed to offer any corroborating evidence of the defendant's earlier
visit-for instance, the defendant might have offered (but did not)
evidence ofthe earlier visit based upon an analysis of the job application
forms filled out that day, using handwriting analysis from a specialist
(whose fee would have been borne by the state). Apparently, such
evidence might have shown that the defendant truly did visit the agency
before the robbery (rather than a "shill" who, I suppose, might have
visited it as an excuse for casing the place, and who might have written
the defendant's name on the forms). Therefore, because the defendant
failed to offer any such evidence, and because it could have been
obtained fairly easily and at the expense of the state, Wishman as
prosecutor dismissed the defendant's explanation of how the agency
manage might have come to have confused the defendant's face with the
face of the actual crimmal. "There were only two ways I could interpret
the absence of a handwriting expert: either the defense counsel had been
negligent or he knew an expert's testimony would have confirmed the
guilt of his client."16
.
The jury convicted the defendant, somewhat to the surprise of
prosecutor Wishman and, initially, in the glow of victory, he was
"elated." But his elation wore off as he yielded to a nagging doubt.
"[Alfter the initial excitement of winning, I looked at what I had done.
I had been so caught up in the contest, the adversarial battle of the trial,
that it hadn't occurred to me that I might have been responsible for the
conviction of an innocent man."17 So, with some anxiety, Wishman
decided to send handwriting samples from the job application forms to
an expert. The ensuing report seemed to confirm the defendant's
explanation. After much effort and exertion (eight months after trial,

16
17

Id. at II.
Id. at 11-12.
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while the defendant sat in prison), Wishman got the original conviction
set aside.
Since I hadn't had a 'substantial belief in the defendant's innocence,
but believed only in the possibility of his innocence, [a judge whom
Wishman respected] would have maintained that legal ethics required
me to continue the prosecution of the case, leaving it to the jury to
make the final decision about guilt. But I had not been able to let the
case rest because I had found the possibility of having convicted an
innocent man too upsetting from a personal standpoint. The prospect
of fighting for the acquittal of guilty men, as I later would do as a
defense lawyer, didn't disturb m~enying society the conviction to
which it was entitled was a different matter, because 'society' was too
abstract an idea for me. But Mrs. Lewis, the nurse I humiliated years
later, would be a casualty of my skill as a defense lawyer in winning an
acquittal, and Mrs. Lewis was not an abstract idea, even if it had taken
her screams to bring that fact home to me. 1S

Wishman's initial assessment of his own actions-his unthinking
assumption about them-is that he is merely doing his chosen
professional task well, both in terms of his vicarious responsibility for
his client (i.e., protecting and advancing the client's interests through
legal means) and in terms of his personal responsibility for doing his job
well (i.e., undertaking and fulfilling the task of cross-examination, or the
task of prosecuting an accused criminal). Wishman knew how to present
a case to a jury, he knew how to cross-examine a hostile witness; and
that is the end of his responsibility for his actions or their consequences.
On this view of the matter, then, each legal task or action involved
Wishman only as a professional, only in his professional capacity; it did
not implicate him as a person, or in any personal way. In the nurse's
case, Mrs. Lewis simply did not understand that "as all criminal lawyers
know, to be effective in court I had to act forcefully, even brutally, at
times. I had been trained in law school to regard the 'cross' as an art
form. In the course of my career I had frequently discredited witnesses.
My defense of myself had always been that there was nothing personal
in what I was doing."19 And this conception of professional responsibility
is not idiosyncratic to Wishman; it is widely shared throughout the legal
profession by lawyers and judges.
For example, in the (wrongly?) accused defendant's case, Wishman
remembers that when he tried to inform the original trial judge ofthe

18

19

Id. at 13-14 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 6.
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possible wrongful conviction, the judge rejected Wishman's attempt to
intervene, or to correct what he now saw as a mistake. "The judge said
I had had no business meddling with the conviction; our adversary
system had separate roles: a prosecutor should prosecute and a defense
lawyer should defend, and if I had had doubts about the handwriting,
they should have been resolved before the conviction."2o Wishman did
not, however, end up accepting this judge's view of his responsibility for
the result of that trial. Similarly, almost a decade later, Wishman was
shocked by Mrs. Lewis' attack, and he began to realize that he had
humiliated her in cross-examination.
So Wishman comes to see himself and his actions differently; he
comes to see an aspect of himself and his actions that he had previously
missed. For whatever reason, Wishman's experiences get him thinking,
forcing him to think about who he is as a lawyer and what kind of a
lawyer-and a person-he is turning himself into as he continues
through his admittedly successful legal career.
The very last paragraph in Wishman's chapter closes with an
expression of fear: "[O]ne thing was clear: that nurse's anger, her
palpable hatred of me, frightened me. Not that I expected her to harm
me physically, but I was frightened by the person she saw ... frightened
that I could be seen that way ... frightened that I might be that person."21
The fear expressed here is as palpable as Mrs. Lewis' hatred for
Wishman, and it is complex. In part, of course, Wishman fears the force
of Mrs. Lewis' assault; but another aspect is Wishman's recognition that
he fears what-if he explores further his actions and his thoughts about
them-he may learn about himself. Self-knowledge is not easy, and it is
not pretty, and it is not fun, however much it may benefit us. A medicine
may help us, but its bitterness still repels, and the taste may linger.
"[This] is why the path of self-knowledge is so ugly, hence so rarely
taken, whatever its reputed beauties. The knowledge of the self as it is
always takes place in the betrayal of the self as it was. "22 How many of
us truly want to know who we are and what we have done? Wishman's
willingness to confront himself and his actions is unusual, and
unusually candid.

rd. at 12.
rd. at 18 (emphasis in original). This honest portrayal of the anxiety in two people
confronting one another, is one of the best things about Wishman's account. It seems to
capture the anxiety we can feel when we truly inquire into who we are and what we have
done (or what we are in the process of doing).
22 Stanley Cavell, THE WORLD VIEWED: REFLECTIONS ON THE ONTOLOGY OF FILM 160 (New
York: Viking Press, 1971).
20

21
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IS PERSONAL

Without having done justice to the rhythm of Wishman's story,
which develops naturally and powerfully to its climax in the frightening
recognition scene I have just quoted, and without having done justice to
its moral complexity (because it is not simply obvious that Wishman's
initial actions were morally wrong), I want to consider briefly one aspect
of Wishman's dawning awareness that perhaps he had done wrong
(morally). What I think Wishman begins to see or to realize is that he
and his behavior could be viewed the way they were seen by Mrs.
Lewis-because he begins to see himself and his actions this way. This
leads me to ask two questions: First, how is it that Wishman could be
blind, initially, to this possible way of se·eing himself and his actions?
Second, what allows or enables him to become aware of this possibility?
What lets him see himself in this way (i.e., in the way that Mrs. Lewis
saw him)?
Wishman had not known or understood-had not been aware of
(until Mrs. Lewis screamed at him)-how he had acted toward her when
he, Wishman, had questioned her during the rape trial. Similarly, as
Wishman admits, he had not been aware of what he might be doing in
the robbery-Mace assault case ("it hadn't occurred to me that I might
have been responsible for the conviction of an innocent man,,23). What
seems to make this blindness possible is Wishman's acceptance of the
common ideology oflawyering. Wishman believes, that is, that while he
is engaged in the activities that constitute being a lawyer, he is
responsible only for representing the best interests of his client (and,
thus, his moral responsibility is reduced or narrowed to coincide with
the limits of his vicarious responsibility to his client). Whoever gets in
the way of the protection of his client's interests is fair game: any such
person can be treated with impunity by Wishman, apparently, so long
as Wishman's actions toward this other person protect the legitimate
interests ofWishman's client.
This is, I believe, the common internal vision ofthe legal profession,
its understanding of its responsibilities. So, ascribing such a view to
Wishman may not be controversial. Still, evidence supporting the
ascription of this view to Wishman can be found throughout his story.
Consider a sampling of passages in which Wishman describes his
motivations and satisfactions:

23

Wishman, supra note 2, at 11.
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I had applied to law school with a deeply held beliefthat I could satisfy
some high, even noble, expectations as a lawyer. Although I had never
articulated what those expectations were, I knew I cared about the
poor and the underdog; although I may have had only a hazy idea of
what justice was, I did have an acute, albeit intuitive, sense of
injustice. 24

****
[AJs for any moral component to my work, I knew that it had less to do
with right and wrong than with an obscure identification with the
underdog, even a despicable underdog, against authority. 25
(2) About The Judge for Whom He Clerked
I clerked for a criminal trial judge, Charles S. Barrett, Jr., of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, a gentleman of humor and intelligence
and decency. Every day in the course of his trials Judge Barrett made
specific decisions based on his sense of justice. Of course, he was
guided by statutes and opinions of higher courts, but the details of a
case often required interpretations that could be made only by relying
on his personal convictions. I greatly admired the judge for those
personal convictions; I sensed he had struggled with the more profound
human questions and answered them with a consistency that seemed
well-considered intellectually and satisfying emotionally. There was
nothing I wanted more than one day to be a man of such integrity and
conviction. 26
(3) About Learning The Lawyer's Craft
I had to admit that I was getting more out of what I was doing as a
criminal lawyer than money or the intellectual satisfaction of
supporting the legal system. I would confess, over the years, to ego
gratification and the joy of good craftsmanship: plotting out an
intricate strategy, carrying off a good cross-examination, soaring
through a moving summation-and the sound of the jury saying 'not
guilty-are all thrilling. 27

****

24
25
26
27

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 7.
at 17.
at 7.
at 16-17.
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I tried, as an act of will, to limit my vision to what I actually did in the
courtroom-the trial was a fascinating process, a game, and I was good
at it and getting better all the time. I didn't believe I was making the
world safer from criminals; I was learning a trade that I enjoyed, and,
like most prosecutors, I was getting the experience and credentials I
needed to go out on my own in private practice. 28

****

So I began trying one case after another, and I learned my trade and
loved what I learned. 29

These remarks express Wishman's cares and commitments, his values,
and they number three: (1) he says that he cared deeply about injustice,
especially as it related to poor people; (2) he expresses his admiration
and affection for the judge for whom he clerked; and (3) he tells of his
satisfaction in learning the craft of criminal litigation, the skills of
lawyering. These three areas of value and concern are the three areas
to which Wishman has committed himself in his formation as a lawyer;
they are the things about which Wishman most cares. (Only in the law?
Or in his life? Or can the two not be separated?)
I do not think that Wishman's cares and commitments are
idiosyncratic. They seem, on the contrary, to be quite ordinary concerns
for any person aspiring to be a lawyer in America in the late twentieth
century. For example, Wishman's expectations in law school and his own
sense of justice (or of injustice) remain inarticulate, ''hazy'' and
"obscure." (Well, who among us has managed to articulate his
expectations, or her sense of injustice? In law school, or in practice?)
Wishman allows that he wants to emulate Judge Barrett, and yet he
finds that he has neither the judge's faith in God nor the judge's belief
in our penal system. 30 (Who among us can say otherwise? Who among us

Id. at 15.
Id. at 10.
30 Wishman gives this account of the distance he perceives between himself and Judge
Barrett:
Now as I thought back about my judge, almost twenty years later, fresh from my
disquieting encounter with Mrs. Lewis, I admired more than ever, and envied, his
ability to prevent difficult and, at times, harsh decisions from disturbing other parts
of his life. Although I firmly believed that society required criminal laws to protect
itself, I could not put aside my belief that the acts of a criminal, horrendous as they
often were, were usually caused by factors or events beyond the control of the
'criminal.' And the thought of an inhumane penal system raised in my mind, and
more so in my heart, the gravest doubts about the whole system of justice. Lastly,
ifit had been religious belief that gave my judge the strength to do the harsh things
his job required, I, unfortunately, didn't have such belief.
Id. at 8-9.
28
29
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does not have a hero or heroine to whom we do not measure up?)
Finally, Wishman enjoys the sense of mastering his craft, but his
gratification stems from "the joy of good craftsmanship," nothing more.
(In our profession, isn't this common enough?)
If Wishman's history is unexceptional, then I would guess that his
sense of impersonality and anonymity (with respect to people and events
who appear during the course of his life yet who seem to be essentially
unconnected with his life) also matches a large number oflife-stories for
lawyers. For most of us lawyers, we are "hired guns" or mouthpieces,
doing the legal work for others, and happy about it to the extent that we
are relatively well-paid for our services. If our work is vicarious, then so
too are our pleasures or gratifications.
We can assess the morality of Wishman's actions in this regard by
developing George Fletcher's insight that "the normal commitments of
our lives-expressed as 'loyalties'-provide a sounder basis for the moral
life than [does] an Enlightenment ideal that is ... incapable of
realization."31 The opposite of loyalty is betrayal, and I have earlier
quoted Stanley Cavell to the effect that we come to learn the self only in
our betrayals of it. The term "betrayal" is usefully ambiguous here,
because it connotes both expression and treachery (or disloyalty). I
understand Cavell's point to be two-fold. First, his remark means that
we come to learn about the self to the extent that we "betray" it by
expressing or revealing it. So our knowledge of a self (be it our own or
another person's) consists in, or depends upon, its being revealed. Selfknowledge turns upon the extent to which, and the ways in which, we
reveal ourselves in and by our actions (which consist in our words as
well as our deeds). But, second, Cavell's conception of self-knowledge
also means that self-knowledge retains the bitter taste of betrayal,
because to bear witness to (or to recognize) the self is necessarily to
move beyond (or outside) it-to view it from the outside, as though it
were an object. And this objectification of the self is, in a sense, a
betrayal of it, a disloyalty to it (as the self stood-even if this "betrayal"
is done on behalf of the self as it now stands).

31 George Fletcher, LoYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSlllPS x (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993).
The idea that our ordinary cares and commitments are fundamental to our moral
standing and status, is central to Part Three of Stanley Cavell's monumental work, The
Claim of Reason. See Stanley Cavell, THE CLAIM OF REASON: Wl'ITGENSTElN, SKEPITCISM,
Morality, and TRAGEDY 245-326 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). A similar idea
is a motivating force in Harry Frankfurt's collection of philosophical papers. See Harry G.
Frankfurt, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988)(especially Chapters 7-8).
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I would put the broader moral of both Fletcher's and Cavell's
remarks this way: Morality is as much or more a matter of trying to
understand and assess human (personal) relationships, as it is one of
trying to understand and assess human actions according to impersonal
rules or principles or laws or maxims. Because of this, if we are to
understand and appreciate our moral responsibility, then we must
understand and appreciate our relationships with and to the people,
places, and things that constitute our lives. This is a very abstract or
general way of saying that morality is in part a matter of relating
ourselves to others, and to our selves. So, for example, Cavell says:
In ... morality, one human being confronts another in terms of that
person's position, and in a mode which acknowledges the relation he is
taking towards it. And in ... [morality], 'in terms of that person's
position' means, in terms of what he is doing and must do and ought to
do. In ... morality this means, in terms of his cares and commitments ....
The problems of morality then become which values we are to honor
and create, and which responsibilities we must accept, and which we
have, in our conduct, and by our position, incurred. 32

In attending to some of Wishman's commitments and in compiling, a
moment ago in my text, a list of his loyalties, I was trying to use
Fletcher's and Cavell's insights (on the nature of morality, and on the
nature of self-knowledge) as a way of coming to learn who Wishman was
when he acted the way he did toward Mrs. Lewis and the unnamed
accused defendant. I was trying, in other words, to gain some knowledge
of his self (as it then stood in relation to those people and events).
This method of self-knowledge (which proceeds by attending to a
person's cares and commitments and personal relations) is also a method
of moral analysis. It is a way of judging the morality of Wishman's
actions, because it affords us a way of coming to learn what he was doing
when he acted in those ways toward those people. It allows us to observe
how Wishman thought and spoke about his own actions and about those
other people. In particular, this method affords us a way to collect and
assess the reasons that Wishman gave, or the excuses he entered, in
explaining his behavior. These reasons or excuses or explanations are
what Cavell calls "elaboratives," and they are (on Cavell's view of
morality) important moral data:
[K]nowing what you are doing and what you are going to do and what
you have not done, cannot fully be told by looking at what in fact, in

32

Cavell, supra note 31, at 325 (emphasis in original).
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the world, you do. To know what you are doing is to be able to elaborate
the action: say why you are doing it, if that is competently asked; or
excuse or justify it if that becomes necessary. What you do and fail to
do are permanent facts of history, and the root of responsibility. But
the trunk and branch of responsibility are what you are answerable for.
And where your conduct raises a question, your answers will again be
elaboratives. I have described moral arguments as ones whose direct
point it is to determine the positions we are assuming or are able or
willing to assume responsibility for; and discussion is necessary
because our responsibilities, the extensions of our cares and
commitments, and the implications of our conduct, are not obvious;
because the self is not obvious to the self. 33

If our responsibilities are "the extensions of our cares and
commitments," and if "the implications of our conduct ... are not
obvious," then it seems true that what the self has done-our actions,
these extensions of our selves-need not be clear or obvious to us. Or, at
least, their meaning, their consequences, their morality, need not be
clear or obvious. And, in cases where their meaning or moral
implications are not clear or obvious, in order to discover or to discern
their moral meaning or implications, we shall have to analyze and argue
and, generally, discuss these matters. In this sense, then, "the self is not
obvious to the self." What a particular self is, and what it has done, and
what it is doing, and what it is capable of doing, are not obvious to us.
They require elaboration-as, for example, I am trying to elaborate the
moral aspects ofWishman's actions as they relate to issues and concepts
of professional responsibility.
V.

THE NECESSITY OF ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY

From my perspective, professional responsibility is-and must
be-personal. It is the recognition that lawyers are people doing things
to (and for) other people (as well as doing things to and for themselves).
And, whatever else professional responsibility is or may be, it is a matter

Id. at 311-312 (emphases in original). Continuing his thought, Cavell says:
To the extent that that responsibility is the subject of moral argument, what makes
moral argument rational is not the assumption that there is in every situation one
thing which ought to be done and that this may be known, nor the assumption that
we can always come to agreement about what ought to be done on the basis of
rational methods. Its rationality lies in following the methods which lead to a
knowledge of our own position, of where we stand; in short, to a knowledge and
definition of ourselves.
Id. at 312.
33
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of our coming to learn to understand and assess the ways in which
people behave in the roles and through the forms that the law makes
available to them (as lawyers, as clients, as parties to legal actions, etc.).
So, for example, I read Wishman's story as illustrating a growth in
professional responsibility because it illustrates a movement of the self
toward increased understanding and assessment (as my motto from
George Eliot would term it, this movement proceeds from "moral
stupidity" toward professional responsibility).
I understand Wishman's growth or professional development-the
increase in his moral sensitivity and sensibility-to be based, in
particular, upon his having taken personal responsibility for what was
happening, or for what had happened. On my view, Wishman took
personally-and saw his own personal stake in-the actions or events
that he recounts in the first chapter of his book. Wishman saw how he
was implicated lin what happened. to Mrs. Lewis, what was done to her
(by him throughI the means and tools he had mastered from the medium
of our legal sysFem [e.g., cross-examination as an "art"]). Wishman saw
or realized that he, a person, did that to Mrs. Lewis, another person, on
behalf of yet a third person (Wishman's client). Now, the question arises:
How could Wishman have done that to her?
In studying Wishman's account of how he related to Mrs. Lewis and
to the possibly falsely accused defendant he prosecuted, and paying
some attention to Wishman's remarks about his relations with other
people, I notice that, time and again, Wishman explains or excuses his
behavior by saying, in effect, "Nothing personal."34 (For example, the
adversarial attack on Mrs. Lewis had not been meant or intended by
him to be taken personally.) Wishman distances himself, that is, from
any activity going on or from its effect, by claiming for it an impersonal
status (in terms of its intent or animus). Or he excuses himselffor doing
what he does as a lawyer by claiming that it is meant only to achieve a
certain legal effect (the suggestion being that its effect on the person of
any party involved in the legal process is, thus, irrelevant).
The suggestion seems to be, then, that you (the object of my attack)
should not take my attack (my action) personally-even though you are
a person and I am a person, and this is how I treated you. But what
sense does this suggestion make, when the context is one in which this
is the relationship we have-because this is the way that I have acted

3. Wishman, supra note 2, at 6. See also id. at 7, 8 (twice), 9,13,16,17, and 18, for other
contexts in which Wishman invokes the term "personal" in characterizing a relationship
that he either did or did not have with someone who in some way mattered to his life (in
terms of his development as a lawyer).
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toward you? Somehow, it seems, I (the actor) expect you (the sufferer of
my action) to ignore the relation I have already established between us
(by means of the way I have acted). How is this to be done-can it be
erased magically? Or else, you (the sufferer of my action) are supposed
to absolve me of my moral responsibility for having treated you this way.
Why? Because I have the role I have in our legal system or because I
play the part of a lawyer in our society? None of these possible responses
or explanations makes sense to me morally; they seem to ignore the fact
that the morality of a person's actions is based, in large part, upon the
nature of the relationships such actions establish (or define or destroy
or modify) with the people affected by those actions.
How we might recognize this basic fact of moral responsibility and
act upon it (rather than ignoring it), is suggested in the way that
Wishman subsequently acted toward Mrs. Lewis and the allegedly
falsely accused defendant. In the case of the accused defendant,
Wishman tells us that he himself "was relieved by the thought that [hel
had done all [hel could to undo a possible miscarriage of justice for
which [hel had, in part, been responsible."35 Wishman admits, further,
that he ''had not been able to let the case rest because [hel had found the
possibility of having convicted an innocent man too upsetting from a
personal standpoint."36 Wishman took the situation-the plight of the
convicted man-seriously because he took it personally, felt his personal
involvement in the case; and because he accepted his share of the
responsibility for this perhaps innocent man having been convicted.
(Perhaps these two characterizations-taking something personally, and
accepting one's responsibility-are simply two ways of saying the same
thing.)
As to Mrs. Lewis, Wishman came to treat her as a person, not an
abstraction. "Mrs. Lewis was not an abstract idea, even if it had taken
her screams to bring that fact home to me."37 So, unlike the abstraction,
"society," Wishman came to feel some connection,with Mrs. Lewis, some
solidarity with her, which meant that he no longer could cavalierly
dismiss the way he treated her. "I could no longer deflect the
realization-this chilling glimpse of myself-that I had used all my skill
and energy on behalf of a collection of criminals. Not all of them, but
many, had been monsters-nothing less-who had done monstrous
thingS."38 Again, this perception led Wishman to take responsibility for

35

36
37

38

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 12.
at 13.
at 14.
at 16.
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his actions, for what he had done. To the accusatory question, asked of
Wishman time and again-"Don't you take responsibility for what a
criminal you get off may do next?" Wishman's once flippant answer was
no longer self-availing. "I could no longer give that answer. I didn't want
to be flippant with Mrs. Lewis, nor could I dismiss her with lofty,
jurisprudential arguments. The ferocity of my courtroom performances,
and those of other criminal lawyers, had terrible consequences on
individual lives."39 Here, I think, we witness Wishman taking
responsibility for his actions and even for the way the legal system
treats the accusers of criminals-which can be, terribly. Wishman
humiliated Mrs. Lewis on cross-examination; and the subsequent
realization-that he did this to her-enables him, or compels him, to
accept his responsibility (-for having done that to her on behalf
of.-vicariously for-his client).
I have said that Wishman's story is a tale of moral progress, a kind
of pilgrim's progress if you will, and my title suggests one way of
characterizing the trajectory of this case of professional development.
But Wishman's story illustrates more than merely his own reformation,
or transformation; it is a morality tale for all legal professionals (and,
perhaps, for all professionals; so, too, then, perhaps for all people).
On the question of self-transformation, or the reformation of the self,
I know of no better book than Herbert Fingarette's The Self in
Transformation. 40 There Fingarette argues that "the essence of
therapeutic and moral progress is ... to accept responsibility, i.e., to
accept as ours the task of doing something about [the problems
confronting us] ."41 In psycho-therapy this means that "[a]pparently the
patient must accept responsibility for traits and actions of his which are
the inevitable results of events over which he had no control and of
actions which he did not consciously will."42 Despite the fact that we
cannot control all ofthe events in which we are implicated, or all ofthe
results of our actions, Fingarette argues that it remains fair to hold us
responsible for these things. "[P]aradoxical as it may seem, this is
precisely the case.,,43
This may seem a harsh view of life, an arbitrary and inhumane
one. In fact it is harsh to a degree, but it is not arbitrary or inhumane.

Id. at 17.
Herbert Fingarette, THE SELF IN TRANSFORMATION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND
THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT (New York: Basic Books, 1963).
41 Id. at 163 (emphasis in original).
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
43 Id. (emphasis in original).
39
40
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It is the brute fact which mature human beings and immature ones
with moral insight have long recognized in their practice and at times
in their theory.
It is not arbitrary, for there is a reason for accepting
responsibility.... [T)his [seems] an unjustifiable burden. And it will
always appear unjustifiable so long as one looks to the past for the
reason. It is to the future, however, that we must look for the
justification of this profound moral demand. It is not that we were
children and thus nonresponsible but rather that we are aiming to
become mature persons. This ideal, and not the past, is the ground for
the harsh demand that we accept responsibility for what we are, even
though we are in many ways morally evil and even though we could
not help ourselves.
Guilt is retrospective, but responsibility is prospective.
Responsibility is based upon a willingness to face the world as it is
now and to proceed to do what we can to make it the world as we
would like it to be. To accept responsibility is to be responsible for
what shall be done."

Earlier in his book, Fingarette says that self-transformation can be
thought of or characterized as "the movement from\immaturity to
maturity, from ignorance to insight, from bondage to liberation, from sin
to salvation, or in any of a number of other ways .... "45 In choosing the
figure of "moral stupidity" from Eliot's vast novel, Middlemarch, I have
betrayed my own proclivity for wishing to think of professional
development as a kind of movement from innocence to experience, or
sinfulness to salvation.46
I conclude this section, and this stretch of thinking, by quoting
Fingarette once again:
To face the world and oneself as they truly are and to accept
responsibility for what in each of these one can control are the
necessary conditions of maturity. It is not a penance for the past but
the price of the future. Humility is of the essence.

« Id. at 164 (emphases in original).

Id. at 10.
There is another point of similarity between Fingarette's thought and Eliot's image.
Fingarette makes the following comment:
Responsibility comes relatively late in life; guilt appears very early in life. Thus we
can be guilty where we are not responsible .... In this sense, at least, we are born into
sin. For we are involved with evil and guilt before we are able to assume that
responsibility for our self which might, at least ideally, keep us from having the
wishes which constitute morally the fact of the spirit's corruption.
Id. at 168.
45
46
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Honest humility reveals that to accept responsibility, considering
what we start with, is a heavy burden. To say, as criticism, that this
is not 'fair' or 'just' is to suppose that the world is fair and just. This is
precisely what the world is not. It has no design leading to some
inevitable, built-in moral future. It is we human beings who can reach
humanity only by accepting the challenge to make the world just. 47

VI.

WHAT HOPE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN A TRADITIONAL LEGAL
ETHICS CLASS?

Wishman's story tells how he was shocked out of his complacency by
some one's reaction to his behavior as a lawyer; and how, years earlier,
he himself had been shocked by his own callousness, his own wilful
indifference or blindness to the quite real possibility that he had helped
to convict an innocent man. These two confrontations with himself and
with his behavior as a lawyer, these two self-revelations, led Wishman
to ponder what kind of a lawyer-and what kind of a person-he was
becoming. These two incidents shook Wishman out of his self-absorption
into an appreciation of what George Eliot, in my motto, calls the
"equivalent centre of self," of solidity and worth, that any other human
being possesses. These experiences also, simultaneously, enabled
Wishman to see his own relationship to these "equivalent" selves, for
whose fate Wishman at least took partial responsibility on a personal
basis.
Wishman's discoveries about himself exemplify one course that
moral development or growth can take. It is not that moral change must
happen this way, but only that it can occur in this way. Wishman's
autobiography portrays, then, one way in which a person can become
aware of the moral dimension or aspect of his actions. This dawning
awareness is not an abstract idea; rather, it is what Eliot calls a
conception "with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but
feeling-an idea wrought back to the directness of sense."48 Such a
feeling has sufficient force to make us stop and think; and then, with the
help of self-reflection, or critical thinking, perhaps we can change our
ways. In this respect, then, by scrutinizing Wishman's story, we may
learn something more about moral development.
Having said this, however, I am not sanguine about the possibility
(much less, the likelihood) of such learning taking place in a traditional
class on Legal Ethics. Wishman made the discoveries he made-about

47

4.

Id. at 166 (emphasis in original).
See text, supra, at note 1.
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himself, about the law, about lawyering, about what he had done to Mrs.
Lewis and others-because he was able to refer to his actions in the
contexts in which they truly occurred. As I have tried to make clear in
Sections I and II of this paper, teachers of a traditional Legal Ethics
class are not able to reproduce or duplicate actual lawsuits, parties, or
clients. Because of this, I know of no way in which students in such
classes can work on relating themselves to such entities. And, without
testing and assessing the ability or inability of students to do these
things, I think it unlikely that students in traditional Legal Ethics
classes can make similar discoveries about themselves (i.e., discoveries
similar to the ones Wishman made about himself). With respect to a law
school course designed along what I have been calling "traditional" lines,
then, self-knowledge is not vouchsafed the students.
We claim that Socratic teaching is a form of self-knowledge, or that
it is based upon a method designed to lead to self-knowledge; certainly,
I have said such things in print, and I believe them.49 But this claim can
be made for that method of teaching only because the tools and
materials for coming to learn something about ourselves are all there,
in the typical law school classroom. In a traditional Legal Ethics class,
I claim they are not. We lack something, we are missing something-if,
that is, our aim is to achieve self-knowledge about the morality of our
actions and our ability to resolve ethical conflicts (as opposed, for
example, to learning or memorizing the provisions of our professional
codes).
Try as I may, I do not have much hope that anything I do
pedagogically in such a classroom can redress or supply what is lacking.
And this is why I said at the beginning of this paper, I find such
teaching unrewarding. -Still, I accept responsibility for it, and for what
I do in the classroom in response to this lack.

49

See my essay cited supra, note 4.
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